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 'Episodic memory, new directions in research' contains 15 chapters, many by 
leading researchers in the field. The book originates from a discussion meeting of the 
Royal Society that was called to review recent developments in episodic memory 
research. An introductory chapter is provided by Allan Baddeley and the book concludes 
with a discussion by Endel Tulving. The remaining 13 chapters cover a wide range of 
topics and approaches. These include, amongst others, the distinction between 
'remembering' and 'knowing', false memories and memory for spatial context. The various 
chapters discuss not only behavioral data obtained with healthy humans but also data 
from humans with brain damage, animal studies and neuroimaging studies. In fact, only 
four chapters are primarily concerned with behavioral research using 'normal' human 
subjects. A complete listing of the chapters and contributors can be found at the website 
of Oxford University Press (http://www.oup-usa.org/toc/tc_0198508808.html). 
 An important topic of the book is our ability to mentally travel back in time and 
relive past experiences. In drawing the distinction between episodic and semantic 
memory, Tulving (1972) originally focused on the different types of information stored in 
episodic and semantic memory. Episodic memory is involved in the storage and retrieval 
of temporally dated events or episodes. Semantic memory on the other hand is involved 
in the storage and retrieval of general knowledge such as the meaning of words, 
knowledge of the metric system and the fact that Amsterdam is the capitol of the 
Netherlands. In later publications, Tulving (1983) emphasized phenomenological aspects 
of episodic and semantic memory. An important distinction made by Tulving is that 
between autonoetic (self-knowing) and noetic (knowing) consciousness. Autonoetic 
consciousness is a defining property of episodic memory and is expressed as conscious 
recollection of past experiences (reliving the past). Noetic consciousness on the other 
hand is associated with semantic memory and is expressed as a feeling of familiarity or 
knowing. 
 The distinction between autonoetic and noetic consciousness is a recurrent topic 
that is discussed in several of the book's chapters and plays a central role in a chapter by 
Gardiner. In his chapter, Gardiner discusses the remember-know paradigm which has 
become increasingly popular over the last 15 or so years. In this paradigm, subjects are 
given a recognition task and for items classified as old (i.e., for items that subjects think 
were presented on the study list) subjects are asked to give a 'remember' or 'know' 
judgment. A remember judgment must be given if subjects recollect specific details of the 
  
earlier presentation of the word. A know judgment must be given if subjects recognize the 
word but do not recollect specific details about its earlier presentation. Gardiner discusses 
a variety of studies showing that remember and know judgments are differentially 
affected by a number of variables. Not surprisingly, for those familiar with Gardiner's 
work, he argues that the remember-know distinction does not correspond with differences 
in confidence or memory strength, bur rather reflects different forms of awareness that 
arise from the operation of different memory systems. Although this conclusion would 
probably not be shared by the entire community the chapter gives a nice overview of the 
work that has been done in this area. 
 One of the chapters I particularly liked is that by Clayton, Griffiths, Emery and 
Dickinson on episodic-like memory in animals. According to Tulving's (1972) original 
formulation of the distinction between semantic and episodic memory, spatio-temporal 
experiences are encoded in episodic memory. Because, according to Tulving, animals do 
not have episodic memories they should not be able to store and retrieve unique 
experiences containing information about what, when and where. Contrary to this idea, 
the authors describe a series of carefully designed experiments that convincingly show 
that scrub jays can recall what kind of food they stored where and when. In one of the 
discussed experiments jays cached three kinds of food (fresh mealworms, fresh crickets 
and peanuts) in different locations. After varying retention intervals (4, 28 or 100 hours) 
the jays were allowed to 'recover' the cached food (in fact the food had been removed 
during this interval to eliminate any perceptual cues about which food was stored where). 
Jays normally prefer mealworms and fresh crickets over peanuts which was evident in the 
search preferences after a short interval. Mealworms and crickets are, however, perishable 
and jays that had been trained to learn this showed a change in search preference for the 
longer intervals (i.e., at longer intervals they preferentially searched locations with 
peanuts). Additional experiments showed that jays also remembered what foods they had 
recovered on previous occasions. In his concluding chapter, Tulving agrees that these 
experiments show episodic memory by the 1972 standards but argues that they do not 
demonstrate autonoetic consciousness. Hence, these results do not show true episodic 
memory as defined by his later 1983 theory. One can wonder of course how such 
consciousness could be demonstrated in animals (to be fair it should be mentioned, 
though, that some possible approaches to this problem are briefly discussed in Tulving's 
chapter). However, regardless of whether or not the scrub jay data are problematic for 
Tulving's theory, the data are interesting in and of itself as they demonstrate that animals 
have rich memories for single events and can use such memories in a flexible way. 
  
 Although the book covers a variety of topics and approaches to episodic memory, 
I missed two things in the book. First, I found that formal approaches to memory where 
somewhat underrepresented. Influential models such as SAM, TODAM or the more 
recently developed REM model (Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997) are not discussed. Formal 
modeling is interesting for several reasons, one of the most important being that it forces 
one to make underlying assumptions explicit. It is often hard to derive testable predictions 
when assumptions about processes and representations remain unspecified and I fear that 
some of the theories proposed in the book are hard to test. Second, I would have liked a 
chapter discussing the recent research investigating the role of inhibitory processes in 
memory retrieval. I my opinion, the research by Michael Anderson and colleagues (e.g., 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995) on this topic is one of the most interesting developments in 
episodic memory research in the last 10 years because their results challenge virtually all 
theories of memory. 
 Overall, however, I found the book informative and I would certainly recommend 
it to someone interested in episodic memory. The book could be used in an advanced 
memory course, but is certainly also of interest to researchers in the field. As so many 
papers are being published on a wide variety of topics within the field of memory it is 
virtually impossible to keep track of all new developments. The present book is of 
interest to anyone who wants to be up-to-date on some of the new developments in the 
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